Where Is the Power? Transnational Networks, Authority and the Dispute over the Xayaburi Dam on the Lower Mekong Mainstream by Hensengerth, Oliver
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rwin20
Download by: [Northumbria University] Date: 30 October 2015, At: 10:09
Water International
ISSN: 0250-8060 (Print) 1941-1707 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rwin20
Where is the power? Transnational networks,
authority and the dispute over the Xayaburi Dam
on the Lower Mekong Mainstream
Oliver Hensengerth
To cite this article: Oliver Hensengerth (2015) Where is the power? Transnational networks,
authority and the dispute over the Xayaburi Dam on the Lower Mekong Mainstream, Water
International, 40:5-6, 911-928, DOI: 10.1080/02508060.2015.1088334
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02508060.2015.1088334
© 2015 The Author(s). Published by Taylor &
Francis.
Published online: 20 Oct 2015.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 56
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Citing articles: 1 View citing articles 
Where is the power? Transnational networks, authority and the
dispute over the Xayaburi Dam on the Lower Mekong Mainstream
Oliver Hensengerth*
Department of Social Sciences and Languages, Northumbria University, Newcastle-upon-Tyne NE1
8ST, UK
(Received 18 August 2014; accepted 26 August 2015)
Accounts of hydro-hegemony and counter hydro-hegemony provide state-based con-
ceptions of power in international river basins. However, authority should be seen as
transnationalized as small states develop coping strategies to augment their authority
over decision-making processes. The article engages Rosenau’s spheres of authority
concept to argue that hydro-hegemony is exercised by actors embedded in spheres of
authority that reshape actor configurations as they emerge. These spheres consist of
complex networks challenging customary notions of the local-global dichotomy and
hydro-hegemony. Hydro-hegemony is therefore not fixed. The article examines these
processes by analysing the dispute over the Xayaburi Dam in the Mekong Basin.
Keywords: water governance; hydropower; scales; transnational authority; water-energy
nexus; Mekong
Introduction
Power asymmetry in international river basins has been analysed as a source of conflict
(Liebman, 2005) and as a source of cooperation. Zeitoun and Warner (2006) developed
their hydro-hegemony model to argue that hegemony can have beneficial as well as
detrimental effects depending on the strategies of hegemons. Daoudy (2009) pointed
out that power asymmetries can lead to bilateral and basin-wide arrangements as tradi-
tional sources of power – geographic position, military and economic resources – may be
less important than other sources such as bargaining and issue-linkage used by disadvan-
taged states. Similarly, Dinar (2009) explained that weaker states have the capacity to
influence the hydro-political context; and Kuenzer et al. (2013) argued that upstream–
downstream conflicts are subject to complex power plays that determine the distribution
of hydropower costs and benefits. A number of authors have taken these lines of analyses
further by analyzing the ability of international river basin organizations to absorb
upstream–downstream tensions (De Stefano, Edwards, De Silva, & Wolf, 2010;
Giordano et al., 2013; Pearse-Smith, 2012; Wolf, Yoffe, & Giordano, 2003).
In presenting these arguments, the literature largely engages premises from mainstream
international relations theory, particularly neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and regime
theory. This produces state-based accounts of conflict and cooperation. The state is black-
boxed and preferences taken for granted. Yet, when looking specifically at hydropower it is
necessary to realize that hydropower plants are transnational projects that see the involvement
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of a plethora of state and non-state actors, thus reducing the state’s ability tomake autonomous
decisions. We therefore need to look at how dominant domestic elites embed themselves in
transnational networks in order to augment their power position to forward their goals in the
contest over the development of the international river basin.
The article proposes to reconceptualize authority and hegemony in the field of international
development, using hydropower policy in international river basins as a case study. It engages
Rosenau’s (2003) spheres of authority concept to show that authority should be analysed as
being exercised by actors embedded in transnational spheres of authority. As spheres of
authority emerge, actor configurations are reshaped. These spheres of authority, while they
may change, consist of complex networks of domestic government actors, domestic and
transnational civil society organizations, multinational corporations, donors from developed
countries, new donors from emerging economies, and international river basin organizations.
The result is the emergence of spheres of authority in a process that questions the local–global
dichotomy and customary notions of hegemony and counter-hegemony.
These processes influence the nexus. ‘Nexus’ has appeared in different constellations
and complexities, including water–energy (Siddiqi & Anadon, 2011) and water–food–
energy–climate (Beck & Villarroel Walker, 2013). In this article, it is understood as water–
energy in the way that describes competition between different goods: energy production
versus environmental and social protection. This materializes as competition between
bureaucracies in charge of producing these goods: the environment and energy bureau-
cracies. In transboundary basins these competing bureaucracies become part of spheres of
authority. Domestic authority and bureaucratic conflicts acquire a transnational dimension.
As Scott et al. (2011) point out, water–energy nexus is primarily understood in input–
output terms “mirrored by footprint calculators”, with lack of attention to the institutional
problems of in-tandem resources management, including scalar mismatches. Hussey and
Pittock (2012) argue that water and energy are often managed separately. This is also true
for the Xayaburi case, in which the aim of energy production overrides the consideration
of externalities produced by hydropower plants.
The article examines these processes by analyzing the dispute over the Xayaburi Dam.
It argues that Laos acquires hydro-hegemonic characteristics for the purpose of Lower
Mekong development through the creation of a transnational network that transcends
traditional notions of scale. Rather than examining what sort of power Laos possesses, the
purpose of the article is to analyze the strategies of government actors to safeguard their
interests vis-à-vis the Mekong River Commission (MRC), donors from developed coun-
tries, and the downstream riparians Cambodia and Vietnam.
The article begins with an overview of the literature on hydro-hegemony and counter
hydro-hegemony. It then analyzes the literature on transnational authority, arguing for a
reconceptualization of the idea of hegemony in transboundary basin politics. The article
then applies these ideas to hydropower politics, focusing on the dispute around the
Xayaburi Dam. The events examined concentrate on the period between October 2010
when the Lao government submitted the planning documents for Xayaburi to the MRC
Secretariat and November 2012 when the government held the groundbreaking ceremony.
Data come from interviews conducted during a four-week field stay in Laos in
September 2011 with personnel in the MRC Secretariat, national development agencies,
researchers and civil society organizations. Information from personal communication
with a former advisor to the MRC was added in August 2014. A total of 21 interviews
were conducted. Interviewees were chosen for their knowledge of MRC procedures and
policies, decision-making processes for the Xayaburi Dam, and the evolution of regional
water politics. Where interviews are cited in the text they appear coded to ensure
912 O. Hensengerth
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [N
or
thu
mb
ria
 U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 1
0:0
9 3
0 O
cto
be
r 2
01
5 
anonymity. To keep up with current events, the article relies on authoritative newspaper
articles.
Hydro-hegemony and counter-hegemony
In their article on hydro-hegemony, Zeitoun and Warner (2006) (and later Zeitoun and
Allan 2008; Zeitoun et al. 2011) systematize the role of power in transboundary water
relations by identifying strategies a hegemonic country can devise in order to realize its
policy goals. However, while advancing the power-based analysis of transboundary water
politics, the hydro-hegemony framework leaves the state as a black box, with imprecise
analysis of how power works and taking preferences for granted. The absence of actors in
the hydro-hegemony framework is a central weakness. Indeed, Lopes (2012) pointed to
the limitations of the framework embedded as it is in a Westphalian sovereignty paradigm.
Cascão’s work on counter hydro-hegemony remedies some of these weaknesses
(Cascão, 2008; Nicol & Cascão, 2011). Yet, this framework, while better populated
with actors and not treating geographic positions as deterministic, also treats the central
government as a unitary entity able to devise grand strategies for basin politics. The state
remains black-boxed.
In order to understand transboundary water politics more fully, an understanding of
national development plans, their rationale and the actors developing them is necessary.
The shape of these development plans is influenced by government elites preferring the
support of certain sectors, such as agriculture or hydropower, to achieve national devel-
opment. Where these national development plans target the use of national stretches of a
transboundary basin, they have the potential to affect directly the relationships between
riparian governments (Hensengerth, Dombrowski, & Scheumann, 2012). Indeed, as
Suhardiman, Giordano, and Molle (2012, pp. 573–574) point out, the
focus on state interaction and national interests does not explain how states’ decision making
at transboundary levels stems from, or reflects (bureaucratic) power interplay at the national
level [. . .] accurate and realist reflection of what actually represents a country’s national
interests, even if considered only at the formal government level, must also take into account
complex domestic bureaucratic landscapes.
In addition, hydropower politics in an international river basin is not a domestic issue.
Particularly economically less developed countries such as Laos do not have the capacity
to fund and build dams themselves. They depend on external funding and globally
operating construction companies. This further transnationalizes the hydropower project.
As a consequence, the ability of domestic elites to realize their development policies
becomes contingent on the transnational networks in which they are embedded. This
raises the issue of who has authority over the decision-making process and where the
locus of authority rests. The next section examines the nature of authority in a transna-
tional policy context.
Authority in a transnational policy context
The rise of new donor countries and with it rising foreign investment of private and state-
owned companies in the hydropower sector, particularly from Brazil, China and India, has
changed the dynamics of dam construction. No longer are Northern donors and firms the
dominant funders and builders, but private and state-owned banks and construction
Water International 913
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companies from emerging economies. In the Lower Mekong Basin, this development is
evident with the rising influence of financiers and project developers from Thailand,
China, Vietnam and the wider region, including Malaysia (Middleton, Garcia, & Foran,
2009).
In addition, the growing number of domestic and regional non-governmental organi-
zations (NGOs) with their links to globally operating NGOs, international donors, and
river basin organizations produce overlapping and competing sets of actors (e.g. Atzl,
2014). This embeds national decision-making authority in complex transnational
networks.
As new actors emerge, governing an issue area becomes more complex. The devel-
opment of complex transnational networks within which international development poli-
cies are formulated and implemented has led Robinson (2002) to call for the
deterritorialization of the concept of development. Indeed, the configuration of actors in
transnational networks implies a diffusion of authority away from the state. As a result,
globalization is often assumed to weaken states in a process from government to govern-
ance (Rhodes, 1996). To capture the changing nature of authority, Rosenau (2003) has
coined the term ‘spheres of authority’ to “deterritorialize the concept of authority”
(Rosenau, 2007, p. 89). Spheres of authority describe the crisis of authority as a state is
weakened in its capacity to “move toward its goals” (Rosenau, 2003, pp. 71–72), as “[i]
nformal and non-institutional forms of authority (spheres) may emerge at least to supple-
ment, if not replace, the long-established formal and institutionalized structures of author-
ity” (p. 294). Some spheres may become partners of states, other do not. Some are
partially based on territoriality, others are fully transnational. Spheres of authority include
issue regimes, professional organizations, transnational advocacy groups, “business sub-
scribers to codes of conduct”, terrorist networks and other “diverse collectives that have
become sources of decisional authority” (p. 295). Compliance by adherents of a sphere of
authority to directives issued by its leadership is key for a sphere of authority to forward
its goals (Rosenau, 2007).
The rise of private actors and non-state forms of authority has produced a voluminous
literature exploring issues of legitimacy and authority (Higgott, Underhill, & Bieler, 2000;
Koppell, 2010; Sassen, 2006) and the extent and limits of private governance in relation to
the state (Hallström, 2004; Levy & Newell, 2005). While some observe a weakening of
the state (Jessop, 2002; Rhodes, 1994; Strange, 1996), others argued that state support
remains crucial for private governance to be effective (Van Harten, 2005). Furthermore,
private actors can enhance the legitimacy of governments and inter-governmental orga-
nizations (Graz & Hartmann, 2012; Graz & Nölke, 2008).
Largely overlooked in these debates is that states can also develop coping strategies to
utilize globalization. The case of Laos, as will be shown, is an example of how phenom-
ena of globalization, such as the proliferation of multinational corporations, can be
utilized to augment power. Indeed, state actors remain central and can actively steer the
composition of networks. This is akin to arguments that the ‘government to governance’
paradigm is too simple and perhaps misleading (Hysing, 2009; Koch, 2013). As Sending
and Neumann (2006) pointed out, the emergence of NGOs and other non-state actors does
not necessarily imply a transfer of power, but the emergence of a changed logic of
government.
Yet, as states can utilize processes of globalization to further their own interests, the
capacity of governments to do so becomes reliant on external actors. The proliferation
of non-state actors and the emergence of mixed forms of authority – state, non-state,
formal and informal – makes it necessary to assess who has authority in these networks
914 O. Hensengerth
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [N
or
thu
mb
ria
 U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 1
0:0
9 3
0 O
cto
be
r 2
01
5 
to help separate consequential from non-consequential action. Latham, Kassimir, and
Callaghy (2001, p. 9) emphasized that “the right to pronounce and act – to be
authoritative – is [. . .] inseparable from order-making, however contingent or provi-
sional”. This view of order is not necessarily connected to the nation-state but is a
product of interactions in territories, from “local, translocal, and national to the
regional and transnational” level (p. 7).
To examine who has authority in transnational networks and, therefore, in Latham
et al.’s terms who is involved in order-making, we can look at Risse (2006) and Katsikas
(2010). Katsikas argued that private authority should be defined as ‘in authority’ rather
than ‘an authority’ as the authority of private actors can only be observed when their
involvement has legal implications. He argued that these two categories of authority are
not properly distinguished in global governance, leading to an ‘exaggeration’ of the
influence of private organizations. This is identical to Risse (2006) who argued that
transnational governance can only be spoken of when private actors – firms and NGOs
– are not merely involved as lobbying or influence-seeking organizations, but when they
are directly involved in “rule-setting, rule-implementation, and service providing activ-
ities” (p. 181).
Yet, while the distinction is useful for analytical purposes, both forms of authority are
interlinked. In transnational networks, to be an authority is important to legitimize claims,
whereas to be in authority is important to resolve procedural issues. Therefore, in the
creation of transnational networks, agents seen as an authority are important for legiti-
macy claims, while agents in authority have procedural power over other actors. An
authority and in authority are therefore both crucial to the successful establishment and
maintenance of authority over an issue area, that is, for the purpose of maintaining control
of the policy-making process.
The limited territoriality of hydropower politics and the problem of scales
In order to resolve the contradiction between the centrality of national decision-making
and the rise of non-state authority, we can turn to Bulkeley’s (2005) notion that an
understanding of environmental governance requires a negotiation between horizontal
and vertical, or scalar and networked forms of governance. Bulkeley argues that scale
should not simply be seen as vertically arranged hierarchies ranging in decreasing
succession from the global to the local. Instead, a reconceptualization of scale should
include “relations of status, authority and importance” (p. 886). As a consequence,
“hierarchies of scale do not necessarily need to be ordered in spatially extensive terms
from the global to the local, but can take different forms depending on the social relations
in question” (p. 886). We should thus be mindful of the fact that environmental govern-
ance processes “do not take place within a pre-given scalar structure, but are rather
constitutive of the construction of particular scalar fixes and particular environmental
outcomes” (p. 890).
The key here is – to borrow from Bulkeley – that the river basin is scaled and rescaled
in relation to hydropower politics. This means that the river basin loses its connotation as
a pre-given scalar unit that can be delineated by using territorial or ecological boundaries
(Warner, Wester, & Bolding, 2008). Instead, the basin becomes a unit whose boundaries
are fluid and dependent on the issue in question. Taking account of this problem, Magee
coined the term ‘powershed’ to argue that the watershed is an insufficient analytical unit
as companies from outside the dam locality are involved in construction and as the energy
is shipped to urban centres outside the watershed, thus involving political–economy
Water International 915
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processes that go beyond a narrowly defined watershed (Magee, 2006; McNally, Magee,
& Wolf, 2009). This calls for transcending the ecological and political limits of the river
basin.
The international river basin thus emerges as a complex space as globally operating
agents become involved in its governance. Consequently, hydro-hegemony and counter-
hegemony need to be reconceptualized as being exercised by actors embedded in transna-
tional spheres of authority, whereby authority needs to be delineated along the lines of in
and an authority in order to evaluate who in these spheres exercises authority in an issue
area that is populated by competing spheres.
The next section examines this with regard to Laos’s policies for the development of
the Mekong mainstream dams, with particular emphasis on the Xayaburi Dam.
Laos, the transnationalization of counter-hegemony and the making of the Xayaburi
Dam
The conflict between Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam and the role of the MRC
have been discussed extensively in the literature and, therefore, will only be sketched here
briefly. All four countries have an interest in hydropower development and have powerful
hydropower bureaucracies that influence energy policy-making (Benedikter, 2014;
Hensengerth, 2015). In Thailand political support is more fractured. The energy utility
EGAT and the Ministry of Energy are amongst the key supporters. However, since the
failure of the Pak Mun Dam and due to a vigorous anti-hydropower civil society, hydro-
power is only supported for construction outside Thailand for the purpose of importation
(Matthews, 2012). The contention between the countries is therefore not about hydro-
power per se. Vietnam’s opposition to upstream dams is motivated by the potential threat
to the Mekong Delta, while the key concern of hydropower proponents in the Cambodian
energy bureaucracy is that upstream dams will thwart Cambodia’s own plans to build two
downstream dams, Stung Treng and Sambor (Hensengerth, 2009; Hirsch & Jensen, 2006).
The key agency in the Lao hydropower decision process is the Ministry of Energy and
Mines. Within it, the Department of Energy Policy and Planning is tasked with developing
national energy policy and plans, including hydropower (Asian Development Bank
(ADB), 2013). Centred on the Ministry of Energy and Mines, the pro-hydropower
discourse is strongly influenced by ideas of hydropower as a cornerstone for national
economic development. As Vilaysone Sourigna of the Department of Energy Promotion
and Development emphasized,1 the government is interested in affordable and sustainable
electricity for economic growth and poverty alleviation (Sourigna, 2011). To achieve this,
the government pursues “twin goals of meeting domestic demand and realizing the [. . .]
electricity export potential. Investment in hydropower and other renewable energy sources
will be a priority” (ADB, 2013, p. 13). Given that much of Laos is situated within the
Mekong watershed and that its geography makes it an ideal candidate for hydropower
generation, hydropower has become the most important source of electricity identified by
the government. The technically viable capacity lies at 20,000 megawatts (MW), of which
by 2011 only 2570 MW were exploited (ADB, 2013). Xayaburi alone should add
1285 MW.
The regional body that is supposed to coordinate this development is the MRC, based
on the 1995 Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the
Mekong River Basin (the Mekong Agreement). The Mekong Agreement (articles 1–3, 5
and 7) requires the four signatory states to cooperate in the development of the basin,
protect basin ecology, observe norms of reasonable and equitable utilization, and not
916 O. Hensengerth
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cause significant harm to downstream countries through their water use. As a part of this
the signatory states are required to notify each other of their water-use plans and to seek
consultation and agreement. While some projects only require notification, mainstream
projects also require consultation and agreement. These rules are spelled out in the
Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation and Agreement (PNPCA). Mainstream
hydropower dams also have to comply with the MRC’s 2009 Preliminary Design
Guidance for Proposed Mainstream Dams in the Lower Mekong Basin. Yet, the MRC
has no territorial rights in member countries. While the Mekong Agreement is legally
binding, it lacks enforcement mechanisms (Backer, 2007; Ratner, 2003; Wyatt & Baird,
2007).
Laos, Thailand and Vietnam are represented in the MRC through their Ministries of
Natural Resources and Environment. The Cambodian representative is the Minister for
Water Resources and Meteorology. All four countries are therefore represented through
their water resources bodies, but these occupy weak positions vis-à-vis the energy
ministries in all four governments (interview 19092011). Yet, despite the official function
of the Lao Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, in recent years Laos has
become increasingly represented by the Ministry of Energy and Mines. As a result, the
highest Lao official representing the Lao government in the MRC’s Joint Committee and
Council was Deputy Minister of Energy and Mines Viraphonh Viravong (personal com-
munication with a former MRC advisor, 12 August 2014). Institutionally, the MRC is
therefore in a weak position not only with regards to implementing the Mekong
Agreement but also energy policy development is removed from the reach of the MRC.
In the Lao case, the attempt by the MRC to nurture water resources institutions is actively
thwarted as the Ministry of Energy and Mines has asserted its authority to directly liaise
with the MRC.
Suhardiman et al. (2012, p. 575) call this “discrepancy between regional and national
decision-making landscapes [. . . the] scalar disconnect in transboundary water governance
of the Mekong”. Bureaucratic competition and policy fragmentation at the national level
directly challenge the MRC’s attempt to translate the IWRM principle from the regional
planning level into domestic policy (Suhardiman et al., 2012).
This has consequences for the nexus where cooperation is not seen as positive-sum but as
zero-sum. In Laos environmental protection and economic development are seen as mutually
exclusive. Proponents of energy production and of environmental and social protection are
therefore unable to cooperate, making it impossible to produce positive trade-offs between
sectors, which the MRC has been designed to achieve. This had consequences for the
planning process of the Xayaburi Dam, as the next section will show.
Prelude: the Lao–Thai connection and the Xayaburi PNPCA process
While planning for Xayaburi reaches back to the 1950s–60s, realization of the plans
started only in May 2007 when the Lao government and Thai construction company CH.
Karnchang signed a memorandum of understanding to study the feasibility of the
Xayaburi Dam. Following this, CH. Karnchang commissioned Thai firm TEAM
Consulting to conduct an environmental impact assessment (EIA) and a social impact
assessment (SIA), and TEAM Consulting and Swiss firm Colenco (now owned by
Sweden’s ÅF Group) to conduct the feasibility study. In 2008, CH. Karnchang and the
Lao government signed a project development agreement. In February and August 2010,
TEAM Consulting finalized both the EIA and the SIA. In March 2010, TEAM Consulting
and Colenco finalized the feasibility study. On 29 October 2010, the Lao government and
Water International 917
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Xayaburi Power Co. signed the concession agreement (Government of Laos, 2011;
International Rivers, 2011a; TEAM Consulting, 2010; TEAM Consulting and Colenco,
2010; WWF, 2011).
In June 2010, Xayaburi Power Co. was incorporated as project owner with the
following shareholders: CH. Karnchang (30%), Electricité du Laos (30%), Natee
Synergy (a subsidiary of PTT, 25%), Electricity Generating Co. Ltd (EGCO, 12%), and
Bangkok Expressway and P.T. Construction & Irrigation owning the remaining 13%
(Pöyry, 2011; The Nation, 2012b). In July 2010, the Lao government and the Electricity
Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) signed a memorandum of understanding for a
power purchase agreement (International Rivers, 2011a). In September 2010, CH.
Karnchang signed the engineering, procurement and construction contract (WWF, 2011).
In the same month the Lao National Mekong Committee submitted the project
documents to the MRC Secretariat. This for the first time initiated the MRC’s PNPCA
process. The first PNPCA meeting was held by the MRC’s Joint Committee in Vientiane
in October 2010. During the following six months, the standard duration of the PNPCA,
the four governments were unable to reach a compromise. Six months later, in April 2011
during the Joint Committee meeting that was to conclude the PNPCA process, the
countries decided to leave the final decision on Xayaburi to the MRC Council meeting
in December 2011 (ICEM, 2010; MRC, 2011a). During the council meeting, the ministers
of the four member countries were again unable to reach a compromise, and a decision
was made to commission a study, for which the Japanese government was the first
government to pledge financial support (International Rivers, 2011b; Phnom Penh Post,
2012a).
At the same time, however, Laos’s Deputy Minister for Energy and Mines Viraphonh
Viravong argued that the PNPCA process itself was completed with the Joint Committee
meeting in April 2011, and that the PNPCA only requires consultation but not agreement
(Bangkok Post, 2012b; Government of Laos, 2011). With respect to the envisaged council
study, International Rivers argued that Laos “refused to comment on the study’s draft
concept note” (Trandem, 2012).
Dynamics of network creation: hegemonic or counter-hegemonic?
While the Lao government built its network with Thai companies, the MRC Secretariat
with the approval of member countries commissioned Australia’s ICEM in May 2009 to
conduct a strategic environmental assessment (SEA) of the entire planned mainstream
dam cascade (ICEM, 2010). In September 2010, ICEM submitted the SEA to the MRC
Secretariat, recommending to conduct further studies for a period of 10 years before
starting to construct mainstream dams (ICEM, 2010). According to a senior MRC
employee, the SEA is an independent study that carries no legal obligations for member
countries to follow it (interview 14092011a). According to an interviewee, the Lao
government agreed to the SEA in the belief that it would be a technical process (interview
26092011). Instead, the SEA rapidly politicized the problem and left the Lao government
overwhelmed by the force of opposition (interview 08092011).
While Cambodia and Vietnam expected that Laos follows the advice of the SEA, Laos
did not approve of the recommendations of the study. Cambodia and Vietnam argued for
further studies particularly of the transboundary environmental and social impact which
they argued the TEAM Consulting EIA had neglected (Cambodia National Mekong
Committee, 2011; Vietnam National Mekong Committee, 2011). The argument was
based to the results of the SEA and the MRC Secretariat’s Prior Consultation Project
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Review Report (the MRC’s ‘technical review’ in the context of the Xayaburi PNPCA) of
the Xayaburi project, which found that the Xayaburi design violates the MRC’s
Preliminary Design Guidance for Mekong Mainstream Dams as well as international
best practice (MRC, 2011a). During a meeting in Phnom Penh between the prime
ministers of Vietnam and Cambodia, both premiers expressed concern about the effects
Xayaburi would have on fisheries and agriculture (International Rivers, 2011c).
To press their interests, Cambodia and Vietnam continued to build pressure. Sin Niny,
permanent Vice-Chairman of Cambodia’s National Mekong Committee, threatened to
“file a complaint to an international court” should Laos continue unilaterally to pursue
the project (Radio Free Asia, 2012b). Te Navuth, Secretary-General of Cambodia’s
National Mekong Committee, took a more moderate position saying that Cambodia
would “send an official to Laos” to ensure that construction does not proceed, and
commenting that Laos had been unresponsive to Cambodian interventions (Phnom Penh
Post, 2012b). Lim Kean Hor, Cambodia’s Minister for Water Resources, sent an official
protest note to his Lao counterpart, Noulinh Sinbandhit, demanding that construction of
the dam be suspended until an EIA is completed (Radio Free Asia, 2012d).
Vietnam’s National Mekong Committee meanwhile engaged with international
donors. It produced terms of reference for a study on downstream impacts of mainstream
hydropower dams, with the costs of US$6.3 million to be provided by the Vietnamese
government, and submitted the terms of reference to Laos, Cambodia and Thailand for
comment and to the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment for approval. The
study, scheduled for conclusion in June 2015, was also tabled at a roundtable meeting on
Mekong Delta integrated water resources management with development partners con-
vened by the National Mekong Committee in Hanoi (Viet Nam News, 2012c).
Donors also involved themselves as a group and independently. For example, follow-
ing the meeting between the MRC Council and the MRC’s Donor Consultative Group in
December 2011, the group published a joint statement supporting the findings of the SEA
and the council decision for further study. Development partners also proposed a review
of the implementation of the PNPCA provisions (MRC, 2011c). The fact that the MRC
donors published a joint statement indicates a strong process of coordination behind the
scenes, showing the importance donors attach to the issue (personal communication with a
former MRC advisor, 12 August 2014). As far as individual reactions by donors are
concerned, the US State Department, for instance, pointed to the need of coordinating
river development through the MRC (US Department of State, 2012), and then US
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton raised the issue during her visit to Vietnam,
Cambodia and Laos in July 2012 (BBC, 2012c).
As pressure mounted, the Lao government began to shore up its credibility. It
commissioned Finnish–Swiss consulting firm Pöyry to assess whether Laos had fulfilled
its consultation obligations under the 1995 Mekong Agreement, the PNCPA and the
Preliminary Design Guidance for Proposed Mainstream Dams in the Lower Mekong
Basin (Pöyry, 2011). In the compliance study Pöyry pointed out that improvements
must be made with regards to a sediment flush and fish-passing facilities. Yet, it
concluded that Xayaburi “has principally been designed in accordance with the applicable
MRC Design Guidelines” (Pöyry, 2011, p. 14). Necessary improvements could be carried
out during construction (Pöyry, 2011).
Responding to this, Vietnam’s National Mekong Committee requested the MRC to
review the compliance study. The MRC argued that with Pöyry’s recommended improve-
ments, Xayaburi would be “more or less compliant” regarding sediments, water quality,
aquatic system health and environmental flows; “almost fully compliant” concerning
Water International 919
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [N
or
thu
mb
ria
 U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 1
0:0
9 3
0 O
cto
be
r 2
01
5 
navigation, but only “partly compliant” regarding fish-passing facilities, fisheries ecology
and dam safety (MRC, 2011b). The MRC took particular issue with Pöyry’s suggestion
that fishery studies could be conducted during construction and argued that baseline data
collection and analysis and adaptation of fish bypasses should be “initiated at least two
years before dam construction starts” (MRC, 2011b, p. ii). Hans Guttman, Chief
Executive Officer (CEO) of the MRC, admitted that the MRC had no access to the dam
site and had only seen photographs (BBC, 2012a).
As a reaction, the Lao Department of Electricity2 in the Ministry of Energy and Mines
contracted French firm Compagnie Nationale du Rhône (CNR) to peer review the Pöyry
study, with CNR confirming Pöyry’s findings (Compagnie Nationale du Rhône, 2012a).3
Following this, Deputy Managing Director of Xayaburi Power Co., Rewat Suwanakitti,
said that the dam would be redesigned to allow sediment flush and fish migration, and that
a new design was currently being tested at the Asian Institute of Technology in Bangkok
(Vientiane Times, 2012d). The government also unveiled a scale model to test the
sediment flush (Vientiane Times, 2012e).
The Lao government thus drew on the technical expertise of multinational companies
from Western Europe and specialized regional academic institutions. Addressing the
international press, Deputy Minister of Energy and Mines, Viraphonh Viravong, gave
an interview with Aljazeera reiterating that Xayaburi would be built “in full compliance
with the experts’ recommendations” (Vientiane Times, 2012d).
In a further move to publicize the benign character of the dam, Laos’s Foreign
Minister Thongloun Sisoulith announced that “concerned parties” would be permitted to
visit the dam site (Reuters, 2012a). The visit took place in Luang Prabang on 16 July 2012
and included MRC Secretariat technical personnel, representatives from MRC member
countries, development partners including the ADB and the World Bank, and journalists
including some from the BBC. Pöyry and Compagnie Nationale du Rhône presented their
proposals to redesign Xayaburi (DPA/The Nation, 2012; Vientiane Times, 2012b).
The role of civil society actors
Meanwhile, civil society opposition started to gain pace as NGOs voiced criticism, held
demonstrations and threatened lawsuits to pressure CH. Karnchang and the involved
banks to withdraw from their commitments. NGOs included Save the Mekong, the
Cambodian NGO Mekong Conservation, the Bangkok-based NGO Towards Ecological
Recovery and Regional Alliance (TERRA), a Cambodian group of 200 local villagers led
by Buddhist monks, and the Network of Thai People in Eight Mekong Provinces (Radio
Free Asia, 2012b, 2012c, 2012f; Phnom Penh Post, 2012b; Thul, 2012; Bangkok Post,
2012a). In the light of the inability of opposing actors to exert pressure on Laos, the
Chiang Khong Mekong Conservation Group argued that the only option for local resi-
dents may be sit-ins and other means of obstruction such as a blockade of the Lao–Thai
friendship bridges (The Economist, 2012). International Rivers drew on academic exper-
tise by publishing four comments of Western academics on the Xayaburi EIA, criticizing
it as poor (International Rivers, 2011d).4
On the occasion of the Mekong2Rio conference, an international conference on
transboundary water management in Phuket, Thailand, attended by executives of 14
international river systems and hosted by the MRC, the Network of Thai People in
Eight Mekong Provinces held a protest at the conference venue. The group was allowed
a brief meeting with MRC CEO Hans Guttman. A spokesman of the group said that if
Laos were allowed to go ahead with the dam without the envisaged council study, the
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group would blockade the First Thai–Lao Friendship Bridge (Radio Free Asia, 2012d;
Wangkiat, 2012).
In a further escalation, 15 civil society groups from seven countries lodged a com-
plaint with the Finnish government arguing that Pöyry had violated responsible business
standards and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) guide-
lines on sustainable development, environmental protection and human rights (Radio Free
Asia, 2012i).
On 5 November 2012, the Network of Thai People in Eight Mekong Provinces and
the Network of Community Organization Council in Seven Northeastern Provinces held a
flotilla protest in Nong Khai during the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) in Vientiane
(OoskaNews, 2012b). Both organizations also issued a statement to ASEM leaders
warning of an emerging cross-border crisis in the Mekong Basin (Network of Thai
People in Eight Mekong Provinces and Network of Community Organization Council
in Seven Northeastern Provinces, 2012). On the same day, the Lao government announced
that construction would officially begin on 7 November 2012 (BBC, 2012b). The
groundbreaking ceremony was held accordingly, coinciding with ASEM (Bangkok Post,
2012b).
Discussion: authority, scales and the creation of hydro-hegemony
The government of Laos has a dominant interest in hydropower development. This is
evident in the influence on policy-making of the hydropower bureaucracy in the Ministry
of Energy and Mines. As a consequence, Laos’s government engages in a discourse of
hydropower for economic development. To protect its interests, Laos struck alliances with
the Thai private sector to plan, fund and build Xayaburi. This pitted the Lao government’s
tightly controlled pro-Xayaburi network against a number of opposing groups: down-
stream Cambodia and Vietnam, NGOs, and Northern donors. All groups conducted
separate activities and used as focal point the MRC in its capacity as regional coordinating
body.
Without direct access to the Xayaburi decision-making process, Cambodia and
Vietnam attempted to exert pressure on Laos through bilateral diplomatic channels and
via the MRC. The NGOs conducted sit-ins and demonstrations, lobbied the MRC
Secretariat, filed complaints with MRC donors (Finland) and threatened lawsuits.
Northern donors coordinated behind the scenes and published statements in support of
the SEA. All these groups seized on the SEA as an authoritative study but did not
coordinate their activities. NGOs pursue fundamental environmental norms, emphasizing
the social and environmental impacts on local populations and ecology. Conversely, the
governments of Cambodia and Vietnam are strong supporters of hydropower, with
Vietnam supporting hydropower on tributaries only given the effects of mainstream
hydropower on the Mekong Delta. Opposition to Xayaburi is thus highly fragmented
and without central leadership. While the NGO network could be styled as a sphere of
authority, it has no authority over decision-making.
Through active enlargement of the pro-hydropower network by the Lao hydropower
bureaucracy the Lao government augmented its in authority position as it insulated itself
from funding and other forms of pressure. Furthermore, it brought into its network agents
that it regarded as an authority, a move countered by the opposing groups. Where Laos
engaged TEAM, thus linking up with an engineering consulting firm, the MRC engaged
ICEM, an environmental consulting firm. Where civil society drew on scientific commu-
nities and the government of Vietnam launched a study with international donors, Laos
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drew on the Asia Institute of Technology and Western European companies. Move
followed countermove, leading to the production of competitive structures. For Laos,
the changes made to the original design of Xayaburi appear to have been taken during this
process as a concession to the wide criticism and in an attempt to legitimize the dam.
However, crucially these changes were based on suggestions made by Pöyry and CNR,
both strong supporters of the dam.
None of the anti-Xayaburi actors are in authority. This raises questions for the
terminology of international development. In traditional terms, Northern donors and
transnational NGOs are usually styled as members of a so-called hegemonic discourse,
whether it concerns neoliberal economic policies or environmental sustainability.
Conversely, developing and emerging countries would be members of a subordinate or
counter-hegemonic discourse who defy Northern policies imposed on them chiefly
through lending conditionalities (e.g. Kwauk, 2012). Yet, in the Xayaburi case, as well
as in the global hydropower policy field, the Northern discourse loses its hegemonic
character as funding and construction companies come predominantly from emerging
economies. In the specific case of Laos, the government additionally contracted compa-
nies from Northern countries to add legitimacy, thus transcending the North–South divide.
Specifically, the divide is transcended by mixing scalar and networked forms of
governance, whereby scales, following Bulkeley (2005), should not be exclusively viewed
as vertically organized hierarchical spaces but as produced and reproduced by social
relations. In the context of this article, scales are produced by establishing authority
over decision-making processes for the Lower Mekong mainstream dams. New sources
of development finance from the private sector and governments of emerging countries
are altering developmental and discursive landscapes. This opens new opportunities for
countries such as Laos that previously were highly dependent on Northern countries and
aid organizations for development funding.
The emergence of viable alternatives for development finance influences the status of
Laos as a potentially hydro-hegemonic country, and it is here where we need to be
mindful of the nature of hydropower projects as transnational projects around which
actor networks are configured that may produce new forms of authority.
The hydro-hegemony and counter hydro-hegemony literature has contributed substan-
tial knowledge to the operation of hegemony, but has provided essentially state-based
accounts, although Cascão’s (2008) counter-hegemony approach has opened the literature
to a range of other actors. This shows governmental elites devising coping strategies and
actively using transnational and international actors to forward their development goals
against both domestic and external opposition.
Yet, none of these accounts systematically addresses sources of authority in international
politics and the issue of sectoral fragmentation caused by bureaucratic competition. In order
to do so, we need to link actor strategies and the networks actors produce to an understanding
of the sources of authority. Rosenau’s spheres of authority concept is helpful here. However,
it is helpful not as a description of diminishing state power but rather as a manifestation of
states’ coping strategies in globalization, akin to Sending and Neumann’s (2006) ‘changed
logic of government’. Indeed, we see a re-aggregation of state power, or a reconstitution of
state power, as elites form alliances with transnational actors.
At the same time, bureaucratic competition leads to a zero-sum vision of development,
producing a negative notion of the water–energy nexus as a competitive structure. Therefore,
in order to understand how these coping or re-aggregation strategies work we need to
understand whether relevant actors are in authority and how they maintain that authority.
These processes involve the creation of competing spheres, some of which are not in
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authority. The evolution of competing spheres reflects bureaucratic and sectoral fragmentation
at the domestic government level, avoiding an in-tandem management of interlinked resources
and joint production of goods. An analysis of networks therefore needs to take into account an
analysis of authority in order to understand better how hegemony is created and maintained,
and potentially how it dissipates, although the article does not address this latter point.
Conclusions
By considering the locus of authority in the creation of transnational development net-
works, we arrive at a more complex understanding of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic
groups. With regard to basin politics, this means that hegemony can be exercised by actors
configured in networks that exercise authority over an issue area.
For the purpose of Lower Mekong Basin development, these developments make Laos a
hydro-hegemonic country as elites engage in power re-aggregation by forming networks
with multinational corporations and financiers. Yet, this makes the capabilities of domestic
elites to forward their goals dependent on the networks in which they are embedded. In this
sense, power resources become transnationalized through the involvement of actors external
to the state and also external to traditional notions of political and geographical basin
boundaries. The basin as an analytical unit thus loses clarity of delineation. As a conse-
quence, rather than assume the hegemony of big states, Laos shows that hegemony can come
from a range of sources and can in fact be bought. This, however, makes its hegemonic status
unstable should the assistant country (here Thailand) withdraw its support.
The new surge in dam construction across the developing and emerging world, led by
financiers and construction companies of emerging countries, has changed logics and
geographies of development. At the same time, bureaucratic fragmentation and the
involvement of international and local NGOs in development has produced a development
landscape of extreme complexity. Constellations of interest are complex and produce
intricate webs of alliances between actors involved in pro- and anti-hydropower activities.
These webs include firms, banks, government actors, NGOs, policy entrepreneurs and
members of international organizations from across the North and the South, so that it
becomes difficult to identify discourses and their origin as specifically North or South.
In order to be able to sort out who is in authority over development policies, it is
necessary to open up the state and analyse actor constellations and the methods actors
have designed to prevail in the policy process. This includes an appreciation of bureau-
cratic competition and the consequences for sectoral fragmentation and the impact on the
nexus. It also includes the strategic choice by domestic actors to link up with transnational
actors to augment their power position, which emphasizes the transnational character of
hydropower projects. The spheres of authority domestic government actors create are
therefore key in an analysis of hydro-hegemony.
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Notes
1. The Department of Energy Promotion and Development was dissolved during the reorganiza-
tion of the Ministry of Energy and Mines in 2011 (ADB, 2013).
2. The Department of Electricity was dissolved during a reorganization of the Ministry of Energy
and Mines in 2011 (ADB, 2013).
3. Later the Compagnie Nationale du Rhône distanced itself from its review study by pointing out
that its recommendations “have been proposed at the conceptual level” only and require further
development, and that its mandate did not include “the evaluation of fish migration nor other
environmental issues” (Compagnie Nationale du Rhône, 2012b).
4. They were Philipp Hirsch of the Australian Mekong Resource Centre, University of Sydney;
Zeb Hogan of the University of Reno; Guy Lanza of the University of Massachusetts, Amherst;
and David Blake of the University of East Anglia, Norwich.
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